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of net public funds spent exogenously on immigrants. We take the share of immigrants in the 
total population as a proxy for exogenous spending on immigrants and estimate its effect on 
budget deficits for 20 OECD countries during 1980 – 1995. We find the effect to be 
significant and positive, suggesting that exogenous spending was increasing during that time. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The developments of budget deficits and public debt have raised much concern among OECD 
policymakers in the past. From the beginning of the 1970s, public debt has increased sharply 
in many OECD countries, reaching levels of 100 per cent of GDP and more in several cases. 
Apart from this similar time trend, debt accumulation experiences among countries remained 
curiously diverse. As a consequence, a large literature has studied the accumulation of public 
debt since, starting with the classic tax-smoothing theory of optimal budget deficits
1 and 
continuing with a number of positive political economy theories of budget deficits
2. 
 
This paper looks at the effect of immigration on budget deficits and debt. In the first part, we 
develop a theory of optimal budget deficits in the presence of so-called exogenous spending 
on immigrants. We distinguish between spending on immigrants according to whether it is at 
the disposal of natives during a given budget year or not. Endogenous spending is decided 
upon by natives each year and constitutes a given proportion of spending on natives (e.g. 
transfer spending). Exogenous spending is decided upon less frequently and, therefore, given 
for the duration of at least one budget year – for example, because it is subject to a qualified 
majority or international agreements (e.g. integration and treatment according to human rights 
conventions, asylum application processing or border control). 
 
The government chooses the share of public funds net of debt service to be spent on natives, 
maximising the utility of a representative native. Spending on immigrants is non-utility-
enhancing for natives. In this setting, we find that it becomes optimal for the government to 
run a budget deficit, if the share of exogenous spending on immigrants in net public revenue 
is positive. The optimal budget is balanced in the absence of such spending. Importantly, we 
express all spending as a share of public revenue net of debt service. This way, we assume 
that the interest cost of deficit-spending is spread proportionately over both natives as well as 
immigrants. Thus, while the benefit of public spending is group-specific, the cost of debt 
service is not. This gives rise to a common pool problem and, as a result, a policy of budget 
deficits and debt becomes optimal. 
 
                                                 
1 Barro (1979), Lucas and Stokey (1983, 1987). 
2 See for example Alesina and Perrotti (1995) for a detailed survey.   4
The existing theoretical literature on the public finance effects of immigration only deals with 
public revenue and spending and assumes that the public budget is balanced.
3 Empirical 
evidence, accordingly, corresponds to theory only imperfectly. It usually shows that public 
revenue decreases, while public spending increases with immigration and ethnic 
heterogeneity. For example, in Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999), total public spending 
increases with ethnic fractionalisation.
4 Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) derive a strong 
negative effect of the immigrant share on the labour tax rate and a strong positive effect on 
per capita social transfers.
5 Similarly, Facchini, Razin and Willmann (2004) find a negative 
effect of the immigrant share on the labour tax rate and a strong positive effect on per capita 




The paper is also related to political economy papers on budget deficits and political 
fragmentation. There, socio-economic groups with self-interest adopt policies of over-
spending, which are individually rational but collectively inefficient. Because spending is 
group-specific, while the cost is spread over all groups, incentives are distorted and spending 
becomes ‘too high’. The budget exhibits the characteristics of a common pool, where 
decision-making groups fully internalise the benefits of the spending they propose, but not the 
aggregate cost. The classic contribution in a static setting is Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen 
(1981). Velasco (2000) derives a corresponding ‘deficit-spending bias’ in a dynamic setting. 
 
Similarly, Alesina and Drazen (1991) find that fiscal stabilisations are delayed in the presence 
of political fragmentation. Roubini and Sachs (1989ab) give empirical evidence for the link 
between over-spending and political fragmentation. The key assumptions common to these 
models are that i) there is more than one interest group, benefiting from group-specific public 
spending, ii) all groups have a say in the determination of the budget or the distribution of the 
fiscal burden and iii) all groups share the same budget constraint, enjoying ‘common access’ 
to public funds. 
 
                                                 
3 Much of the existing theory suggests that immigration decreases public revenue and spending, both in models 
of tax competition (e.g. Cremer and Pestieau (2004)) as well as political economy models (e.g. Razin, Sadka and 
Swagel (2002)). 
4 They use cross-section data of 1020 cities, 304 metropolitan areas and 1386 counties in the US in 1990. 
5 They use panel data of 11 European countries over the period 1974-1992. 
6 They use essentially the same dataset as Razin et al. (2002).   5
A third, related strand of the literature argues that budget deficits arise because finitely lived 
governments strategically incur debt in order to constrain the spending potential of future, 
ideologically different governments (Persson and Svensson (1989), Alesina and Tabellini 
(1990)). In this literature, there are two interest groups, one represented by the current 
government, and one by the future government. While the two governments also benefit from 
group-specific public spending (i) and share the same, inter-temporal budget constraint (iii), 
only the current government has a say in the determination of the budget. By over-spending 
today and committing future tax revenues to debt service, the current government can reduce 
spending of future governments. 
 
In our model, natives and immigrants represent the two interest groups benefiting from group-
specific spending. Both groups share the same budget constraint, but only one group (natives) 
chooses spending. The second group (immigrants) withdraws some share of net public funds 
that is partly endogenous, depending on the native spending share, and partly exogenous, at 
least in the short run, as described above. Deficit-spending becomes an optimal policy for 
natives, because by running a deficit, natives can curtail the funds available for exogenous 
spending on immigrants.
7 Here, therefore, debt is also used as a strategic device. The setting, 
however, does not require a change in government. An incentive for deficit-spending arises, 
even if tax-smoothing calls for a balanced budget (see below), and even if there is no (intra-
generational) competition among groups or (inter-generational) strategic interaction among 
governments for the common public funds.  
 
In the second, empirical part of the paper, we estimate the effect of immigration on budget 
deficits for 20 OECD countries during 1980 – 1995. We take the share of immigrants in the 
total population as a proxy for exogenous spending on immigrants and find a significant 
positive effect on the budget deficit, suggesting that exogenous spending was increasing 
during that time. We control for variables suggested by tax-smoothing (see below) as well as 
for variables suggested by a number of political economy models that do not take immigration 
into account.  
 
                                                 
7 The model can be interpreted more generally, in that deficit-spending pressures of this kind can be caused not 
only by immigration, but also by commitments related to foreign aid, anti-terror provisions or the membership in 
international organisations. These can all represent external spending obligations that are not at the disposal of 
governments at least in the short run.   6
We also test for the potential role of immigration within the tax-smoothing theory of optimal 
budget deficits. There, budgets are also chosen by a ‘benevolent social planner’ government 
maximising the utility of a representative agent. Public spending is financed by taxation that is 
distortionary, since it affects labour supply. In this context, it is optimal for the government to 
keep the tax rate constant and run budget deficits when spending is unexpected and 
temporarily high, and surpluses, when it is low. Immigration might therefore cause budget 
deficits in this framework, if it raises spending unexpectedly and temporarily, for example due 
to increased welfare spending during a limited period of integration. We test this hypothesis 
empirically, using the change in the stock of immigrants in per cent of the total population as 
an indicator for a ‘spending shock’ related to immigration. However, we do not find a 
significant effect. We conclude that, in our data set, immigration gives rise to budget deficits 
that are optimal not for reasons of tax-smoothing, but for reasons of exogenous spending on 
immigrants (external spending).  
 
In the following Section 2, we introduce our model of optimal budget deficits with external 
spending. Sections 3 and 4 present simulations and empirical estimations that illustrate the 
role of immigration in the generation of optimal budget deficits. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Model of an optimal budget deficit with external spending 
 
Consider a population which consists of both natives and immigrants. The two groups are 
indexed by  , , ii n m = . Group i obtains some benefit  it g  from the government per period t. 
Public spending is thus strictly separable by recipient group, and can be thought of as either 
transfers to group i’s members or spending on a public good that only benefits group i’s 
members. The native members of the jurisdiction directly determine the amount of public 
spending that accrues to themselves,  nt g . By this, they also partly determine spending on the 
foreign group,  mt g , of which one part depends on spending on natives and one does not: 
  mt nt t gg α β = + . (1.1) 
   7
The first part of public spending on foreigners,  nt g α , is proportional to spending on natives 
(e.g. transfer spending).
8 The second part of spending,  t β , is independent of spending on 
natives. We could, for example, think of integration or administrative costs
9, or the cost of 
border control. Such spending cannot directly be determined by natives in the short run. 
However, it is restricted by the budget constraint and can, therefore, be influenced indirectly 
by the natives’ choice of the budget deficit, as we will see below in an instant. 
 
The public sector gains public revenue τ  per period, which is given and assumed to be 
constant for simplicity. Public spending per period can be financed either by current revenue 
or by borrowing at a constant (net) real rate r .  
 
The government budget constraint in each period is the following: 
 
.
tt n t m t br bg g τ = ++− , (1.2) 
 
where  t b  is the stock of debt at the beginning of period t. 
 
Public spending on natives and foreigners is expressed as a share of public revenue net of debt 
service in each period, respectively: 
 (( 1) ) nt nt t gr b φ τ = −+ . (1.3a) 
 
 () ( ( 1 ) ) mt nt mt t gr b αφφτ =+ − +. (1.3b) 
 
 
nt φ  is the share of spending on natives in period t, while  mt φ  is the share of exogenous 


























                                                 
8  The size of α is not crucial for our results. For example, α = M/N (where M is the number of migrants and N 
the number of natives), if legislation on social policy is non-discriminatory and foreigners do not differ from 
natives in the socio-economic characteristics that determine benefit recipiency. If discriminatory legislation 
excludes foreigners from certain public benefits, per capita spending on foreigners could be lower (α < M/N). 
We could also think of it as being higher, for example due to a relatively higher welfare-dependency of 
foreigners or relatively stronger foreign lobbying (α > M/N). 
9 E.g. the costs for language courses or asylum application processing.    8
We express spending as a share of public revenue net of debt service,  (1 ) t rb τ −+ , which 
implies that the cost of debt service is spread equally over all spending types.  mt φ  as well as τ  
follow an exogenously given time path.  t β  is determined by  mt φ  and  t b , according to (1.4b). 
nt φ  is the control variable, to be chosen by the government. 
 
Assuming that debt cannot grow indefinitely, we impose the usual solvency condition 




→∞ ≤ . (1.5) 
 
The government chooses which share of public net revenue per period,  nt φ , to spend on 
natives, in order to maximise the utility of natives. Utility is given by the present value of the 
log of spending on natives: 
  []
0log ( (1 ) ) e d
nr t
nt t t Ur b t φτ
∞ −
= =− + ∫ . (1.6) 
 
It is maximised subject to (1.2) – (1.5) and to given  0 b . We assume that  0 0 b =  for simplicity. 
In (1.6), it is assumed that the native time preference rate is equal to the interest rate r . This 
way, since income τ  is flat over time, there are no transfer-smoothing reasons for debt 
accumulation.  
  
Solving this optimal control problem
10 yields the optimal native spending share: 
 














The share of public spending on natives is independent of the external spending cost  mt φ . It is, 
however, decreasing in the proportion of spending on foreigners α . 
 
Next, we determine the public debt that results from this spending rule. Substituting (1.7) into 
(1.2) using (1.3a) and (1.3b) and solving the differential equation yields the endogenous 







φ τ −+ ⎡ ⎤ =− ⎣ ⎦ +
. (1.8) 
 
                                                 
10 See the Appendix A for details.   9
Substituting (1.8) in (1.2), using (1.3a), (1.3b) and (1.7)
11, yields the change in public debt 
over time, i.e. the budget deficit: 
 




−+ =  . (1.9) 
 
From (1.8) and (1.9), we immediately find 
 
Proposition 1: If some exogenous share of public net revenue ( 0 mt φ > ) is spent on 
foreigners, it is optimal for natives to run a budget deficit and accumulate public debt. If 
0 mt φ = , natives choose a balanced budget. The budget deficit and public debt are 
independent of endogenous spending on foreigners. 
 
In the absence of exogenous spending on foreigners, it is optimal for natives to have a 
balanced budget and to incur no debt. This is the equivalent of zero optimal debt in Barro 
(1979). If, however, exogenous spending on foreigners occurs, it becomes optimal for natives 
to run a deficit. Note that, unlike for example in Velasco (2000), groups do not compete for 
their shares of overall revenue here. Yet, natives prefer to run a deficit and bear the 
corresponding interest burden rather than adjust to the exogenous spending on foreigners by 
reducing their own spending.
12 The reason is that deficits diminish the funds available for 
spending not only for natives, but also for foreigners. Foreigners share the cost of debt 
service. This increases the optimal budget deficit to some value above zero. 
 
Natives do decrease their spending share with an increase in α  such that the budget remains 
balanced (in case of  0 mt φ = ).
13 In this case, it is cheaper for natives (in utility terms) to adjust 
to an increase in the (endogenous) spending on foreigners by reducing their own spending 
share, rather than by paying interest on debt. This is because by reducing  nt φ , natives can also 
reduce the foreign share of spending  nt αφ , which is not possible in the case of an exogenous 
spending share  mt φ . 
 
                                                 
11 Or, equivalently, differentiating (1.8) with respect to time t . 
12 Natives do not reduce their own share in spending with an increase in  mt φ , see (1.7). 
13 See (1.7).   10
As a consequence of a positive budget deficit in the presence of exogenous spending on 
foreigners, public debt is positive and increasing in  mt φ  (see 1.8). Like the budget deficit, 
public debt is independent of the factor α  of foreign spending.  
 
So far, we have derived the optimal time paths of spending and the budget deficit. The next 
three propositions tell us how the optimal budget deficit changes with 1) exogenous spending 
on immigrants, 2) government income and 3) the interest rate at a given point in time. For 
simplicity, we consider  1 t =  below. From (1.9), we find 
 
Proposition 2: Take  1 t = . Then, the budget deficit is increasing in the share of exogenous 






. It is decreasing in  mt φ  at a 
decreasing rate, if 
12












The optimal budget deficit is increasing in  mt φ , as long as  mt φ  is not too large. While a budget 
deficit can increase the utility of natives by cutting back exogenous spending on foreigners, 
the resulting interest burden of debt service can grow too high to make a policy of increasing 
deficits optimal. At any given point in time, deficits decline the sooner, the higher the share of 
exogenous spending on foreigners  mt φ
14 and the higher the interest rate r , ceteris paribus. For 
plausible parameter values (see Section 3 below), the condition for the budget deficit to be 
increasing in exogenous spending is fulfilled. 
 
Proposition 3: An increase (decrease) in government income τ  increases (decreases) the 
budget deficit and public debt, if  0 mt φ > . 
 
This is in contrast to the tax-smoothing rule of keeping the budget balanced in case of a 
permanent change in income. Here, an increase in government income increases the amount 
                                                 
14 The higher  m φ  is, the higher is public debt, see (1.8).  
   11
t β  that is going to foreigners for any given  mt φ . Natives can cut back on that spending by 
increasing the budget deficit and, in consequence, public debt.
15 
 
Proposition 4: An increase (decrease) in the interest rate r  decreases (increases) the budget 
deficit and public debt, if  0 mt φ > . 
 
An increase (decrease) in the interest rate makes deficit-spending more (less) expensive for 
natives and therefore decreases (increases) the optimal budget deficit. Tax-smoothing would 





For illustration, we now assess quantitatively the optimal value of the budget deficit and debt 
(in per cent of GDP) for a range of possible values of  mt φ  and for plausible values of the 
interest rate r  and period income τ  (in per cent of GDP), which we assume to be constant 
over time. We look at only one period: t = 1 for readability. 
 
In Table 1, we report the simulation results on the optimal budget deficit in per cent of GDP, 
for values of  mt φ  from 0 to 0.16. We assume that initial debt  0 b  is zero.
16 The simulation 
shows that the optimal deficit is 2.95 per cent of GDP for an exogenous spending share of 8 
per cent, when the interest rate is 3 per cent and the share of public revenue in GDP is 40 per 
cent. The optimal deficit increases to 5.43 per cent for  0.16 mt φ = . The budget deficit 
decreases in the interest rate and increases in public revenue.  
 
The average budget deficit of 1.57 per cent in our sample of OECD countries in 1995 (see 
Section 4 below) together with the average sample interest rate (long-term government bond 
yield) of 7.98 per cent and public revenue (tax revenue) of 36.87 per cent of GDP would be 
consistent with an exogenous foreign spending share of 4.47 per cent of net income.  
 
                                                 
15 In Velasco (2000), a temporary windfall is also compatible with a budget deficit. 
16 For  0 0 b > , the deficit at time t  is given by  [ ]
(1 )
0 e( 1 )
mt rt
tm t br b
φ φτ
−+ =+ +  .   12
In Table 2, we report the simulation results on the optimal public debt in per cent of GDP, for 
the above values of  mt φ ,  r  and τ . We again assume that initial debt  0 b  is zero.
17 The 
simulation shows an optimal debt-output ratio of 1.57 per cent for an exogenous spending 
share of 25 per cent, for the baseline parameterisation of r  and τ  - given zero initial debt. 
Optimal debt decreases in the interest rate and increases in exogenous spending and public 
revenue. The average debt-output ratio of 60 per cent from our sample of OECD countries in 
1995 together with an average interest rate of 7.98 per cent and public revenue of 36.87 per 
cent of GDP would, for example, be consistent with an exogenous foreign spending share of 
3.51 per cent of net income and 61 per cent initial debt (not shown). 
 
The simulations show how a small exogenous spending share can potentially explain a 
considerable amount of public debt and deficit. In the following, we will consider 
immigration as a cause for exogenous spending and evaluate empirically the relation between 
immigration and budget deficits. 
 
 
4. Empirical evidence  
 
In this section, we look at OECD countries’ experience of public debt accumulation after 
World War II. Figure 1 shows that in many countries there has been a trend of dramatically 
declining debt starting after World War II until around 1972 and an equally dramatic reversal 
to increasing debt thereafter. The size of debt accumulation, however, has varied a lot across 
countries.
18 For example, by 1995, debt was contained at a level of 50 per cent of GDP or 
below in the USA, United Kingdom, France and Germany (panel a), while it exceeded 100 
per cent of GDP in Belgium, Italy and Ireland (panel b). 
 
Data on the shares of foreigners are scarcer, and are commonly available on a yearly basis 
only from 1980 onwards. Figure 2 shows that within the OECD, the shares of foreigners have 
increased ever since. In the following, we test whether immigration can serve as an 
explanatory variable for the cross-country and time variation in public debt accumulation in 
                                                 
17 For  0 0 b > , public debt at time t  is given by 
(1 ) (1 )
0 1e e
(1 )
mt mt rt rt
t bb
r
φφ τ −+ −+ ⎡⎤ =− + ⎣⎦ + . 
18 According to Franzese (1998), who uses a panel data set of 20 OECD countries during 1956 – 1990, cross-
national differences in post-war average debt comprise about 55 per cent of the total variation in the OECD post-
war debt experiences.   13
20 OECD countries
19 during 1980-1995. The time horizon is constrained by the availability of 
data on immigration, which are commonly available only from 1980 onwards, and of the data 
used from Franzese (1998)
20, which are available only until 1995. 
 
Immigration might give rise to budget deficits for two reasons. First, immigration might 
constitute a spending or revenue ‘shock’ that is temporary and, following a policy of tax-
smoothing, require temporary budget deficits or surpluses. In this case, if changes in 
immigration represent temporary deviations from a certain permanent level, we should 
observe budget deficits to increase or decrease with changes in immigration ( IMM Δ ).  
 
Second, immigration might raise a common-pool problem as described by our model in 
Section 2. The model predicts that immigration can increase budget deficits, if it increases the 
share of spending on immigrants. We use the stock of foreigners in per cent of the total 
population (IMM ) as a measure for the share of spending on immigrants and also add 
2 IMM  
to test for our hypotheses stated in Proposition 2.  
 
 
4.1 Estimation Strategy  
 
Public debt exhibits a strong temporal persistence, calling for estimation in first differences. 
We estimate the change in debt ( t D Δ ), using two lagged changes in debt ( 1 t D − Δ , 2 t D − Δ ) and 
the lagged debt level ( 1 t D − ) as explanatory variables. Z  is a vector comprising the standard 
economic variables suggested by tax-smoothing: unemployment, growth, the interest rate, 
openness, terms of trade and an interaction term for openness and terms of trade, all in 
changes and in lagged levels. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables. Variable 
definitions and sources can be found in Appendix B. We assume that permanent levels are 
constant across all sample country-times, rendering all movements unexpected as well as 
temporary. The variables are also added in lags to allow for long-run equilibrium 
relationships. Finally, we add the change and lagged level in the share of foreigners in the 
total population, to test for the tax-smoothing hypothesis of optimal budget deficits 
(surpluses) related to spending (revenue) shocks caused by immigration. 
                                                 
19 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the USA. 
20 See variable description and sources in Appendix B below.   14
 
Our regression of the change in public debt is the following: 
 
  , 1 ,1 2 ,2 3 ,1 4 , 5 , 6 ,1 , it it it it it it it it DD D D Z I M M I M M α ββ β β β β ε −− − − Δ= + Δ + Δ + + + Δ + + (1.10) 
    
As (1.10) is modelled in first differences, it takes out country differences in debt rates like a 
fixed-effects model. Countries are indexed by i. Time, defined in terms of years, is indexed 
by t, α  is the constant and  , it ε  is the idiosyncratic error term. The  1 β  to  6 β  parameters are to 
be determined by the data. 
 
According to the theory of tax-smoothing, weak (strong) economic performance due to 
adverse (beneficial) shocks in each of these variables should induce governments to increase 
(decrease) debt. We would therefore expect budget deficits to increase with unemployment 
and the interest rate, to decrease with growth and to increase (decrease) with openness and the 
terms-of-trade, if these are associated with a spending (revenue) shock. We further expect 
budget deficits to increase with the interaction of openness and terms-of-trade, since a 
reduction of international competitiveness in the form of an increase in the terms-of-trade is 
more likely to constitute a revenue shock the more open a country is. We further expect 
budget deficits to increase (decrease) with the change and lag in immigration, if immigration 
induces a spending (revenue) shock. 
 
In a second regression, we test whether immigration might cause budget deficits (surpluses) 
due to associated external spending (revenue). Here, we add the share of immigrants and its 




, 1 ,1 2 ,2 3 ,1 4 , 5 , 6 , , it it it it it it it it DD D D Z I M M I M M α ββ β β β β ε −− − Δ= + Δ + Δ + + + + + (1.11) 
 
We expect budget deficits to increase (decrease) with the stock of immigrants, if it increases 
(decreases) the share of spending on immigrants, given that this share is not too large (see 
Proposition 2). Likewise, the sign of 
2 IMM  will depend on two things: first, on the effect of 
immigration on  mt φ , and second, on the magnitude of  mt φ  (see Proposition 2). Taking the 
stock of immigrants as a proxy for spending on immigrants, the expected sign of the former is 
positive and the one on the latter is negative, given plausible parameter values (see Section 3). 




Table 4 shows the results for our estimations of the change in public debt. Specifications (1) 
and (2) correspond to the estimation equations (1.3) and (1.4) described above, testing 
whether immigration gives rise to budget deficits (or surpluses) for reasons of tax-smoothing 
or external spending. In specifications (3) and (4), we add a variety of political economy 
variables as explanatory variables for robustness checks, respectively. 
 
First, looking at specification (1), we see that neither the change nor the lag in immigration is 
significant. This contradicts the tax-smoothing hypothesis of a positive or negative spending 
shock associated with immigration. The first lagged change in debt, lagged debt, the change 
and lag in unemployment, the change in openness, terms-of-trade and the interaction term for 
openness and terms-of-trade are all significant and signed as expected. An increase in 
openness and the terms-of-trade decreases budget deficits, which, according to the theory of 
tax-smoothing, indicates that more openness and an increase in export relative to import 
prices constitute positive ‘revenue shocks’. However, an increase in the terms-of-trade 
increases the budget deficit the more, the more open a country is (and vice versa). For open 
countries, increases in relative prices apparently constitute a ‘spending shock’. Growth and 
the interest rate turn out to be insignificant. This, however, is likely to be a result of small 
sample size, since both variables are highly significant in both changes and lags in a larger 
sample size obtained by excluding immigration.
21 
 
In specification (2), we use the current immigrant share and its square, as hypothesised by our 
theory on external spending. These variables are (weakly) significant, which we take as 
evidence for an external spending effect. The coefficient on the share of immigrants is 
positive, suggesting that, according to our model, immigration increases the exogenous 
spending share, which is small. Given that the exogenous spending share is small, we know 
from our model that the second-order effect of exogenous spending on the deficit should be 
negative. We find the coefficient on the square of the immigrant stock to be negative, which is 
compatible with our model. Results on the other variables are very similar to specification (1). 
                                                 
21 Immigration restricts the sample size and reduces estimation precision, but does not significantly affect the 
coefficients of variables. Using the larger sample without immigration, we find that the interest rate increases the 
budget deficit, while economic growth reduces it, as predicted by the theory of tax-smoothing in case of 
temporary ‘shocks’ to the interest rate and economic growth.   16
 
 
4.3 Robustness checks 
 
To check for robustness, we also run the two estimation models after adding several political 
economy controls. Results remain fairly robust. Our immigration variables in the external 
spending model of budget deficits are now more significant than before. Among the political 
economy variables used, the number of federal regions and its square, and the effective 
number of electoral districts and its square as well as central bank autonomy are significant, 
the number of parties in government is weakly significant, and all coefficients are signed 
consistent with theory.  
 
The number of regions in effectively federal states
22 and the effective number of electoral 
districts
23 are used as indicators for the number of constituencies in a country. According to 
the theory of multiple constituencies and distributive politics by Weingast, Shepsle and 
Johnsen (1981) and Velasco (1995), policymakers who represent geographically distinct 
constituencies tend to over-estimate the benefits of local spending (‘pork-barrel spending’) 
and under-estimate the costs of financing them. The higher the number of constituencies, the 
higher is deficit-financed spending suggested to be. However, federalism might decrease 
budget deficits by substituting central government debt (which is what we measure) with sub-
national debt. Further, both of our measures of multiple constituencies have highly outlying 
countries in their empirical distributions (i.e. there are many unitary systems and few federal 
ones), which is why they are also added in their squares. Results show that the number of 
federal regions decreases budget deficits, which suggests that central government debt might 
be substituted. It does increasingly so, the larger the number of federal regions.
24 The number 
of electoral districts increases budget deficits as expected. It does decreasingly so, the larger 
the number of districts. The hypothesis that autonomous and conservative central banks 
decrease budget deficits, because they rule out inflationary debt-finance, is supported in 
specification (4). 
 
                                                 
22 See Franzese (1998, footnote 17) for a detailed description. 
23 See Franzese (1998, footnote 21) for a detailed description. 
24 In the sample, the U.S. and Switzerland are the countries with most federal regions, followed by Spain, 
Germany and Canada.   17
We further add the number of parties, because a high number of parties is suggested to hinder 
fiscal stabilisation according to the war-of-attrition models of Roubini and Sachs (1989ab) 
and Alesina and Drazen (1991)
25. In the face of high outstanding debt and/or persistent 
deficits, parties in government are likely to dispute over who will bear the costs of fiscal 
adjustment, and budget deficits will increase the more strongly, the more fragmented and 
polarised governments are. The positive coefficient of the number of parties in our estimation 
supports this hypothesis. 
 
Political economy theories that suggest that budget deficits are increasing during pre-election 
years
26, in democracies with higher income disparities
27 and in fiscal illusion as measured by 
the share of indirect taxes in total current revenue
28 are not supported by our data, or only 




Public debt in OECD countries has grown exceptionally during the last few decades. So has 
the share of immigrants. If immigration constitutes a temporary spending shock, it will make 
temporary budget deficits optimal according to the theory of tax-smoothing. If immigration 
uses up a certain given amount of spending, it will make budget deficits optimal as well, 
according to our theory of external spending. We empirically test for these two hypotheses, 
which suggest a positive link between immigration and budget deficits. We find evidence for 
the external-spending hypothesis, but not for the tax-smoothing hypothesis on immigration 
and budget deficits.  
 
                                                 
25 See also Drazen and Grilli (1993) and Spolaore (1993). 
26 Nordhaus (1975), Tufte (1978). 
27 Cukierman and Meltzer (1989), Tabellini (1991). 
28 Buchanan and Wagner (1977) argue that fiscal illusion among voters creates incentives for governments to 
accumulate debt. It is assumed that fiscal illusion increases in the share of indirect taxes, because the costs of 
indirect taxes should be more difficult to assess than those of other taxes.   18
 Tables 
 
Table 1. Simulated optimal budget deficit (per cent of GDP), b0=0 and t=1. 
Baseline parameterisation: τ = 40 (per cent of GDP). 
Interest rate r   mt φ = 0  mt φ = 0.04  mt φ = 0.08  mt φ = 0.12  mt φ = 0.16 
0.03  0  1.54 2.95 4.24 5.43 
0.05  0  1.53 2.94 4.23 5.41 
0.07  0  1.53 2.94 4.22 5.39 
Increase in τ : τ = 50  (per cent of GDP). 
0.03  0  1.92 3.68 5.30 6.78 
0.05  0  1.92 3.68 5.29 6.76 
0.07  0  1.92 3.67 5.28 6.74 
Increase in τ : τ = 60  (per cent of GDP). 
0.03  0  2.30 4.42 6.36 8.14 
0.05  0  2.30 4.41 6.35 8.12 





Table 2. Simulated optimal public debt (per cent of GDP), b0=0 and t=1. 
Baseline parameterisation: τ = 40 (per cent of GDP). 
Interest rate r   mt φ = 0  mt φ = 0.25  mt φ = 0.5  mt φ = 0.75  mt φ = 1 
0.03  0  1.57 3.07 4.52 5.90 
0.05  0  1.57 3.07 4.51 5.89 
0.07  0  1.57 3.07 4.50 5.88 
Increase in τ : τ = 50  (per cent of GDP). 
0.03  0  1.96 3.84 5.64 7.38 
0.05  0  1.96 3.84 5.64 7.36 
0.07  0  1.96 3.83 5.63 7.35 
Increase in τ : τ = 60  (per cent of GDP). 
0.03  0  2.35 4.61 6.77 8.85 
0.05  0  2.35 4.60 6.76 8.84 
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Table 3. Summary statistics of estimating sample, N=240. 
 Mean  S.D.  Min.  Max. 
Public debt (per cent of GDP)  46.14  30.21  9.40  132.01 
Budget deficit  
(change in public debt, per cent of GDP)  0.45 3.50  -18.86  17.78 
Immigration  
(stock of foreigners, per cent of total population)  4.72 4.82 0.27  23.00 
Unemployment rate   7.79  4.61  0.16  23.66 
Real GDP growth rate   2.19  2.40  -9.15  13.56 
Real interest rate  4.36  2.87  -5.96  14.42 
Trade  openness  0.56 0.26 0.14 1.40 
Terms  of  trade  0.98 0.10 0.70 1.38 
Number of parties in government  2.35  1.30  1  5.64 
Pre-election year  0.30  0.35  0  1.83 
Income  disparity  0.85 0.19 0.50 1.35 
Indirect taxes  
(as a fraction of total current revenue)  0.30 0.07 0.14 0.44 
Number of federal regions  4.94  8.17  1  50 
Effective number of electoral districts  42.33  72.60  1  328.93 
Central bank autonomy and conservatism (index)* 0.47  0.21  0.16  0.93 
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Immigration variables      
Change in immigrant stock  -0.041 [-0.41]    -0.052 [-0.52]   
Lag in immigrant stock  0.006 [0.37]    0.005 [0.22]   
Immigrant  stock   0.066  [1.46]  0.010  [1.55] 
Immigrant stock, square    -0.003 [-1.55]    -0.005 [-1.72] 
Debt variables      
First lagged change in debt  2.561 [4.05]  2.427 [4.07]  2.104 [3.20]  2.108 [3.48] 
Second lagged change in debt  0.894 [1.35]  0.878 [1.36]  1.021 [1.49]  1.077 [1.62] 
Lag in debt  -0.023 [-6.51]  -0.024 [-7.37]  -0.023 [-5.77]  -0.025 [-6.75] 
Economic variables      
Change in unemployment  0.132 [4.22]  0.134 [4.02]  0.130 [4.03]  0.121 [3.85] 
Lag in unemployment  0.075 [5.19]  0.082 [6.03]  0.092 [5.02]  0.096 [5.83] 
Change in real growth  -0.930 [-0.73]  -0.974 [-0.79]  -1.717 [-1.29]  -1.818 [-1.42] 
Lag in real growth  0.508 [0.29]  0.487 [0.29]  -0.770 [-0.41]  -0.813 [-0.46] 
Change in real interest rate  -0.000 [-0.02]  0.003 [0.27]  0.005 [0.45]  0.011 [0.98] 
Lag in real interest rate  0.007 [0.67]  0.013 [1.25]  0.017 [1.37]  0.027 [2.19] 
Change in openness  -7.104 [-2.69]  -5.118 [-2.01]  -8.082 [-2.92]  -7.314 [-2.65] 
Lag in openness  0.147 [0.09]  -1.105 [-0.72]  -0.996 [-0.50]  -2.473 [-1.34] 
Change in terms of trade  -3.838 [-2.52]  -2.630 [-1.83]  -4.660 [-2.89]  -4.221 [-2.65] 
Lag in terms of trade  1.043 [1.15]  0.332 [0.40]  0.201 [0.18]  -0.695 [-0.70] 
Change in (openness x terms of 
trade)  5.917 [2.17]  4.079 [1.56]  6.814 [2.35]  6.206 [2.18] 
Lag in (openness x terms of trade)  -0.539 [-0.31]  0.661 [0.40]  0.187 [0.09]  1.612 [0.82] 
Political economy variables      
Number of parties      0.045 [1.60]  0.037 [1.38] 
Pre-election year      0.013 [0.23]  0.017 [0.34] 
Income disparity      0.876 [1.13]  0.956 [1.45] 
Lag in indirect tax share      0.225 [0.16]  0.642 [0.48] 
Number of federal regions      -0.276 [-2.77]  -0.264 [-3.05] 
Number of federal regions, square      0.011 [2.78]  0.010 [2.94] 
Effective number of electoral 
districts      0.011 [2.11]  0.011 [2.41] 
Effective number of electoral 
districts, square      -0.000 [-2.13]  -0.000 [-2.40] 
Central bank autonomy and 
conservatism      -0.593 [-1.30]  -0.839 [-1.97] 
Country-specific  time  trends  included included included included 
Constant  -0.835 [-1.07]  -0.093 [-0.12]  -0.199 [0.17]  0.972 [0.90] 
Observations  221 240 220 239 
R-squared  adjusted  0.56 0.55 0.57 0.57   21
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Note: Shares of foreign populations before 1980 are decennial and not available for all countries.  22
Appendix A 
 
The Hamiltonian corresponding to our optimal control problem is the following: 
 
  [ ] [ ] log ( (1 ) ((1 ) )( (1 ) )
rt
nt t t t nt mt t He r b p r b r b φτ τ α φ φ τ
− =− + + − + + + − + . (A.1) 
 
The time paths of the control variable, the share of spending on natives  nt φ , the state variable, 
public debt  t b , and the value of public debt  t p  are jointly determined by the following three 
formulas: 








++ − + = , (A.2) 
  [ ] (1 ) ( (1 ) ) tt n t m t t br b r b τα φ φ τ =− + + + − +  , (A.3) 
  []
(1 )
(1 )((1 ) )
(1 )
rt








=+ + + + −
−+
 . (A.4) 
 
Solving the three equations for the three unknowns yields the optimal value for the control 
 





















φ τ −+ ⎡ ⎤ =− ⎣ ⎦ +
 (A.6) 
and the deficit 
 




−+ =   (A.7) 
 





   23
Appendix B – Variable Description and Sources 
 
Variable  Description Source 
Public debt  Gross consolidated central 





Change in gross consolidated 
central government debt (per 




Stock of foreigners  
(per cent of total population) 
OECD International Migration 
Statistics. 
OECD Trends in International 
Migration, various issues. 
Various national statistical 
databases. 
Economic explanatory variables    
Unemployment rate  OECD definition  OECD (2004) Economic 
Outlook 75. 
OECD (2004) Labour Force 
Statistics. 
OECD (2005) Main Economic 
Indicators. 
Real GDP growth rate    Penn World Tables 6.1. 
Real interest rate  Long-term government bond 
yield minus inflation  Franzese (1998). 
Openness  Exports plus imports as a 
fraction of GDP  Penn World Tables 6.1. 
Terms of trade  Export price index/import price
index  Franzese (1998). 
Political economy explanatory variables   
Number of parties in government   Franzese  (1998). 
Pre-election year  Indicator Franzese  (1998). 
Income disparity  Nominal GDP per capita 
relative to real wages of 
manufacturing workers 
Franzese (1998). 
Lag in indirect taxes 
(as a fraction of total current revenue) 
  Franzese (1998). 
Number of federal regions  Number of regions in 
effectively federal states  Franzese (1998). 
Effective number of electoral districts    Franzese (1998). 
Central bank autonomy and conservatism  Index  Franzese (1998). 
   24
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